The scope and limits of a mechanistic view of computational explanation.
An increasing number of philosophers have promoted the idea that mechanism provides a fruitful framework for thinking about the explanatory contributions of computational approaches in cognitive neuroscience. For instance, Piccinini and Bahar (Cogn Sci 37(3):453-488, ) have recently argued that neur...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 192; no. 10; pp. 3371 - 3397 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Oct2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=111176320&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 111176320 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2015 vid: 192 iid: 10 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 111176320 10.1007/s11229-015-0709-1 ppf: 3371 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 540KB tig: atl: The scope and limits of a mechanistic view of computational explanation. aug: au: Serban, Maria affil: Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 817 Cathedral of Learning Pittsburgh USA su: Mechanism (Philosophy) Philosophers Cognitive neuroscience Thought & thinking Cognitive ability sug: subj: Mechanism (Philosophy) Philosophers Cognitive neuroscience Thought & thinking Cognitive ability keyword: Computational models Explanation Mechanism Neural computation ab: An increasing number of philosophers have promoted the idea that mechanism provides a fruitful framework for thinking about the explanatory contributions of computational approaches in cognitive neuroscience. For instance, Piccinini and Bahar (Cogn Sci 37(3):453-488, ) have recently argued that neural computation constitutes a sui generis category of physical computation which can play a genuine explanatory role in the context of investigating neural and cognitive processes. The core of their proposal is to conceive of computational explanations in cognitive neuroscience as a subspecies of mechanistic explanations. This paper identifies several challenges facing their mechanistic account and sketches an alternative way of thinking about the epistemic roles of computational approaches used in the study of brain and cognition. Drawing on examples from both low-level and systems-level computational neuroscience, I argue that at least some computational explanations of neural and cognitive processes are partially independent from mechanistic constraints. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2015. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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