DECEPTION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: THEORY AND LABORATORY EVIDENCE.
We model two-candidate elections in which (1) voters are uncertain about candidates' attributes; and (2) candidates can inform voters of their attributes by sending advertisements. We compare between political campaigns with truthful advertising and campaigns in which there is a small chance of dece...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 54; no. 1; pp. 464 - 485 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2016
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=111238777&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 111238777 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jan2016 vid: 54 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 111238777 10.1111/ecin.12236 ppf: 464 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 286KB tig: atl: DECEPTION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: THEORY AND LABORATORY EVIDENCE. aug: au: Houser, Daniel Ludwig, Sandra Stratmann, Thomas affil: Professor, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax VA, 22030 Professor, Department of Economics, University of Ulm, Ulm Germany su: Political campaigns Voting research Political candidates Advertising False advertising sug: subj: Political campaigns Voting research Political candidates Advertising Outdoor Advertising Other Services Related to Advertising False advertising ab: We model two-candidate elections in which (1) voters are uncertain about candidates' attributes; and (2) candidates can inform voters of their attributes by sending advertisements. We compare between political campaigns with truthful advertising and campaigns in which there is a small chance of deceptive advertising. Our model predicts that voters should vote in-line with an advertisement's information. We test our model's predictions using laboratory elections. We find, in the presence of even a small probability that an advertisement is deceptive, voters become substantially more likely to elect a 'low-quality' candidate. We discuss implications of this for existing models of voting decisions. ( JEL C92, D72, D82) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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