Goal-dependence in (scientific) ontology.
Our best sciences are frequently held to be one way, perhaps the optimal way, to learn about the world's higher-level ontology and structure. I first argue that which scientific theory is 'best' depends in part on our goals or purposes. As a result, it is theoretically possible to have two scientifi...
| Published in: | Synthese Vol. 192; no. 11; pp. 3601 - 3617 |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Springer Nature
Nov2015
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=111504363&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 111504363 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Nov2015 vid: 192 iid: 11 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 111504363 10.1007/s11229-014-0649-1 ppf: 3601 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 442KB tig: atl: Goal-dependence in (scientific) ontology. aug: au: Danks, David affil: Departments of Philosophy & Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University, 161 Baker Hall Pittsburgh 15213 USA su: Ontology Goal (Philosophy) Philosophy of science Pluralism Cognition Social structure sug: subj: Ontology Goal (Philosophy) Philosophy of science Pluralism Cognition Social structure keyword: Causal prediction Goals Ocean index Scientific ontology Simulation ab: Our best sciences are frequently held to be one way, perhaps the optimal way, to learn about the world's higher-level ontology and structure. I first argue that which scientific theory is 'best' depends in part on our goals or purposes. As a result, it is theoretically possible to have two scientific theories of the same domain, where each theory is best for some (scientifically plausible) goal, but where the two theories posit incompatible ontologies. That is, it is possible for us to have goal-dependent pluralism in our scientific ontologies. This ontological pluralism arises simply from our inability to directly know the world's objects, rather than any particular claims about our cognitive limits, values, or social structures. I then present two case studies in which this possibility actually occurs-one based on simulations and theoretical analyses of constructed causal systems, and one from actual scientific investigations into the proper ontology for ocean regions. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2015. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|