Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Value of Information for the Imprecise Probabilist.
This article considers a puzzling conflict between two positions that are each compelling: (a) it is irrational for an agent to pay to avoid 'free' evidence, and (b) rational agents may have imprecise beliefs. An important aspect of responding to this conflict is resolving the question of how ration...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 83; no. 1; pp. 1 - 29 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jan2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=111750158&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 111750158 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2016 vid: 83 iid: 1 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 111750158 10.1086/684184 ppf: 1 ppct: 28 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.1MB tig: atl: Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Value of Information for the Imprecise Probabilist. aug: au: Bradley, Seamus Steele, Katie su: Probabilistic generative models Evidence Reason Decision theory Decision making Ethics sug: subj: Probabilistic generative models Evidence Reason Decision theory Decision making Ethics ab: This article considers a puzzling conflict between two positions that are each compelling: (a) it is irrational for an agent to pay to avoid 'free' evidence, and (b) rational agents may have imprecise beliefs. An important aspect of responding to this conflict is resolving the question of how rational imprecise agents ought to make sequences of decisions--we make explicit what the key alternatives are and defend our own approach. We endorse a resolution of the aforementioned puzzle--we privilege decision theories that merely permit avoiding free evidence over decision theories that make avoiding free information obligatory. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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