External representations and scientific understanding.
This paper provides an inferentialist account of model-based understanding by combining a counterfactual account of explanation and an inferentialist account of representation with a view of modeling as extended cognition. This account makes it understandable how the manipulation of surrogate system...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 192; no. 12; pp. 3817 - 3838 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Dec2015
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=111984679&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 111984679 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2015 vid: 192 iid: 12 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 111984679 10.1007/s11229-014-0591-2 ppf: 3817 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 472KB tig: atl: External representations and scientific understanding. aug: au: Kuorikoski, Jaakko Ylikoski, Petri affil: Department of Political and Economic Studies, University of Helsinki, 00014 Helsinki Finland Department of Social Research, University of Helsinki, 00014 Helsinki Finland su: Model-based reasoning Counterfactuals (Logic) Comprehension Phenomenological psychology Epistemics sug: subj: Model-based reasoning Counterfactuals (Logic) Comprehension Phenomenological psychology Epistemics ab: This paper provides an inferentialist account of model-based understanding by combining a counterfactual account of explanation and an inferentialist account of representation with a view of modeling as extended cognition. This account makes it understandable how the manipulation of surrogate systems like models can provide genuinely new empirical understanding about the world. Similarly, the account provides an answer to the question how models, that always incorporate assumptions that are literally untrue of the model target, can still provide factive explanations. Finally, the paper shows how the contrastive counterfactual theory of explanation can provide tools for assessing the explanatory power of models. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2015. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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