Could Reliability Naturally Imply Safety?
The aim of the present paper is to argue that robust virtue epistemology is correct. That is, a complete account of knowledge is not in need for an additional modal criterion in order to account for knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. I begin by presenting the problems facing robust virtue epistem...
| Publicado en: | European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 23; no. 4; pp. 1192 - 1209 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=112022219&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 112022219 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09668373 7PU jtl: European Journal of Philosophy issn: 09668373 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2015 vid: 23 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 112022219 10.1111/ejop.12046 ppf: 1192 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 456KB tig: atl: Could Reliability Naturally Imply Safety? aug: au: Palermos, Spyridon Orestis affil: School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, UK su: Virtue epistemology Reliability (Personality trait) Safety Epistemic logic Ethics sug: subj: Virtue epistemology Reliability (Personality trait) Safety Epistemic logic Ethics ab: The aim of the present paper is to argue that robust virtue epistemology is correct. That is, a complete account of knowledge is not in need for an additional modal criterion in order to account for knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. I begin by presenting the problems facing robust virtue epistemology by examining two prominent counter examples--the Barney and 'epistemic twin earth' cases. After proposing a way in which virtue epistemology can explain away these two problematic cases, thereby, implying that cognitive abilities are also safe, I offer a naturalistic explanation in support of this last claim, inspired by evolutionary epistemology. Finally, I argue that naturalized epistemology should not be thought of as being exclusively descriptive. On the contrary, the evolutionary story I offer in support of the claim that reliability implies safety can provide us with a plausible epistemic norm. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of European Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: European Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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