Intentionality, Normativity and Naturalism.
Hutto and Satne ( Philosophia, 2015) review current attempts to provide a naturalized content and underline some of the most convincing reasons why they remain inadequate. The authors reframe and update Haugeland's assessment of this research program, but besides describing the particular challenges...
| Publicado en: | Philosophia Vol. 43; no. 3; pp. 611 - 625 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Sep2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=112191052&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 112191052 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00483893 1VPF jtl: Philosophia issn: 00483893 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2015 vid: 43 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 112191052 10.1007/s11406-015-9629-z ppf: 611 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 322KB tig: atl: Intentionality, Normativity and Naturalism. aug: au: Varga, Somogy affil: University of Memphis, Memphis USA su: Intentionality (Philosophy) Normativity (Ethics) Naturalism Naturalization Behaviorism (Psychology) sug: subj: Intentionality (Philosophy) Normativity (Ethics) Naturalism Naturalization Behaviorism (Psychology) keyword: Intentionality Normativity ab: Hutto and Satne ( Philosophia, 2015) review current attempts to provide a naturalized content and underline some of the most convincing reasons why they remain inadequate. The authors reframe and update Haugeland's assessment of this research program, but besides describing the particular challenges facing the different candidate accounts, they also propose what seems to be a promising way to further a debate that has not advanced in recent years. In this paper I argue that a more detailed exploration of some aspects of the neo-behaviorist and neo-pragmatist strategies might be helpful in order to advance the discussion. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophia is a copyright of Springer, 2015. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophia holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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