QUINEAN WORLDS: POSSIBILIST ONTOLOGY IN AN EXTENSIONALIST FRAMEWORK.

In "Propositional Objects" Quine sketched a construction of possible worlds that is consistent with his extensionalism. If this construction succeeded, the extensionalist would be able to make good sense of intensional notions and objects. However, Quine ended up rejecting the proposal due to the pr...

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Publicado en:Grazer Philosophische Studien Vol. 89; no. 1; pp. 205 - 229
Autor principal: SANTOS, Pedro
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Brill Academic Publishers 2014
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: QUINEAN WORLDS: POSSIBILIST ONTOLOGY IN AN EXTENSIONALIST FRAMEWORK.
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        au: SANTOS, Pedro
        affil: Universidade Federal de São Paulo
      su:
        Quine, Willard Van Orman, 1908-2000
        Ontology
        Metaphysics
        Philosophy
        Philosophy of mind
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          Quine, Willard Van Orman, 1908-2000
          Ontology
          Metaphysics
          Philosophy
          Philosophy of mind
      ab: In "Propositional Objects" Quine sketched a construction of possible worlds that is consistent with his extensionalism. If this construction succeeded, the extensionalist would be able to make good sense of intensional notions and objects. However, Quine ended up rejecting the proposal due to the problem of "trans-world identity". In this paper I start by reviewing Quine's construction and suggesting some modifications. I then defend it against Quine's objection. I also defend it against two more general objections raised by David Lewis. I conclude that this is the modal metaphysics an extensionalist such as Quine should adopt.
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