Seller Beware: Supply and Demand Reduction and Price Manipulation in Multiple-Unit Uniform Price Auctions.
We experimentally compare under-revelation of supply and demand across alternative variations of ascending and descending two-sided price clock auctions. We find that buyers reduce demand more when the price is ascending but sellers' behavior is consistent across clock directions. As a result, the c...
| Publicado en: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 82; no. 3; pp. 760 - 781 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2016
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=112815071&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 112815071 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2016 vid: 82 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 112815071 10.1002/soej.12086 ppf: 760 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 329KB tig: atl: Seller Beware: Supply and Demand Reduction and Price Manipulation in Multiple-Unit Uniform Price Auctions. aug: au: Winn, Abel M. Parente, Michael L. Porter, David affil: Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, One University Dr., Orange, CA 92866, USA Capital Habeus Unit of the Office of the Federal Public Defender, 321 E. 2nd St., Los Angeles, CA 90012, USA Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University Dr., Orange, CA 92866, USA su: Supply & demand Empirical research Market manipulation Auctions Pricing sug: subj: Supply & demand Empirical research Market manipulation Auctions Pricing keyword: D03 JEL Classification: D02 D03 JEL Classification: D02 ab: We experimentally compare under-revelation of supply and demand across alternative variations of ascending and descending two-sided price clock auctions. We find that buyers reduce demand more when the price is ascending but sellers' behavior is consistent across clock directions. As a result, the clock price rule has empirical effects on efficiency even though it is theoretically neutral. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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