Tariffs, vertical specialization and oligopoly.
We examine optimal tariffs in an environment with vertical specialization where the Home country specializes in final goods and the Foreign country specializes in intermediate inputs. A matched Home–Foreign pair bargains simultaneously over the input price and the level of output, and competes a ` l...
| Publicado en: | European Economic Review Vol. 82; pp. 1 - 24 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Elsevier B.V.
Feb2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=112827248&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 112827248 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00142921 EER jtl: European Economic Review issn: 00142921 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2016 vid: 82 pid: 1004 pub: Elsevier B.V. artinfo: ui: 112827248 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.09.010 ppf: 1 ppct: 23 formats: tig: atl: Tariffs, vertical specialization and oligopoly. aug: au: Ara, Tomohiro Ghosh, Arghya affil: Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Fukushima University, Fukushima 960-1296, Japan School of Economics, UNSW Business School, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia su: Tariff Negotiation Production (Economic theory) Supply & demand Oligopolies sug: subj: Tariff Negotiation Production (Economic theory) Supply & demand Oligopolies Other federal government public administration keyword: Bargaining power F12 F13 Free entry Oligopoly Outsourcing Tariffs Bargaining power F12 F13 Free entry Oligopoly Outsourcing Tariffs ab: We examine optimal tariffs in an environment with vertical specialization where the Home country specializes in final goods and the Foreign country specializes in intermediate inputs. A matched Home–Foreign pair bargains simultaneously over the input price and the level of output, and competes a ` la Cournot with other matched pairs in markets. We find that the optimal Home tariff rate is strictly decreasing in the bargaining power of Home firms, and an increase in the Home firms׳ bargaining power might therefore raise Foreign profits. Under an endogenous market structure with entry followed by matching, the relationship between bargaining power and output is non-monotone if the demand function is strictly concave or convex. This in turn induces a non-monotone relationship between the optimal tariff and bargaining power for a class of demand functions. For linear demand, free trade is optimal irrespective of bargaining power. We show that non-monotonicity result is retained under endogenous bargaining power. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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