Which explanatory role for mathematics in scientific models? Reply to 'The Explanatory Dispensability of Idealizations'.
In The Explanatory Dispensability of Idealizations, Sam Baron suggests a possible strategy enabling the indispensability argument to break the symmetry between mathematical claims and idealization assumptions in scientific models. Baron's distinction between mathematical and non-mathematical idealiz...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 193; no. 2; pp. 387 - 402 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=112901019&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 112901019 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2016 vid: 193 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 112901019 10.1007/s11229-015-0795-0 ppf: 387 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 439KB tig: atl: Which explanatory role for mathematics in scientific models? Reply to 'The Explanatory Dispensability of Idealizations'. aug: au: Bianchi, Silvia affil: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra 08193 Barcelona Spain su: Philosophy of mathematics Idealism Expression (Philosophy) Baron, Sam Model theory sug: subj: Philosophy of mathematics Idealism Expression (Philosophy) Baron, Sam Model theory keyword: Difference-making Explanation Idealization Mathematics Scientific models ab: In The Explanatory Dispensability of Idealizations, Sam Baron suggests a possible strategy enabling the indispensability argument to break the symmetry between mathematical claims and idealization assumptions in scientific models. Baron's distinction between mathematical and non-mathematical idealization, I claim, is in need of a more compelling criterion, because in scientific models idealization assumptions are expressed through mathematical claims. In this paper I argue that this mutual dependence of idealization and mathematics cannot be read in terms of symmetry and that Baron's non-causal notion of mathematical difference-making is not effective in justifying any symmetry-breaking between mathematics and idealization. The function of making a difference that Baron attributes to mathematics cannot be referred to physical facts, but to the features of quantities, such as step lengths or time intervals taken into account in the models. It appears, indeed, that it does not follow from Baron's argument that idealizations do not help to carry the explanatory load at least for two reasons: (1) mathematics is not independent of idealizations in modelling and (2) idealizations help mathematics to carry the explanatory load of a model in different degrees. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2016. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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