The explanatory dispensability of idealizations.
Enhanced indispensability arguments seek to establish realism about mathematics based on the explanatory role that mathematics plays in science. Idealizations pose a problem for such arguments. Idealizations, in a similar way to mathematics, boost the explanatory credentials of our best scientific t...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 193; no. 2; pp. 365 - 387 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=112901028&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 112901028 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2016 vid: 193 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 112901028 10.1007/s11229-014-0517-z ppf: 365 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 488KB tig: atl: The explanatory dispensability of idealizations. aug: au: Baron, Sam affil: School of Philosophical and Historical Enquiry, University of Sydney, Quadrangle A14 Sydney 2006 Australia su: Idealism Philosophy of mathematics Explanation Counterfactuals (Logic) Mathematical symmetry sug: subj: Idealism Philosophy of mathematics Explanation Counterfactuals (Logic) Mathematical symmetry keyword: Counterfactuals Difference-making Idealization Indispensability ab: Enhanced indispensability arguments seek to establish realism about mathematics based on the explanatory role that mathematics plays in science. Idealizations pose a problem for such arguments. Idealizations, in a similar way to mathematics, boost the explanatory credentials of our best scientific theories. And yet, idealizations are not the sorts of things that are supposed to attract a realist attitude. I argue that the explanatory symmetry between idealizations and mathematics can potentially be broken as follows: although idealizations contribute to the explanatory power of our best theories, they do not carry the explanatory load. It is at least open however that mathematics is load-carrying. To give this idea substance, I offer an analysis of what it is to carry the explanatory load in terms of difference-making and counterfactuals. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2016. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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