On Stackelberg mixed strategies.
It is sometimes the case that one solution concept in game theory is equivalent to applying another solution concept to a modified version of the game. In such cases, does it make sense to study the former separately (as it applies to the original representation of the game), or should we entirely s...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 193; no. 3; pp. 689 - 704 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Mar2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=113040236&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 113040236 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2016 vid: 193 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 113040236 10.1007/s11229-015-0927-6 ppf: 689 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 649KB tig: atl: On Stackelberg mixed strategies. aug: au: Conitzer, Vincent affil: Duke University, Durham 27708 USA su: Game theory Nash equilibrium Parsimonious models Representation theory Probability theory sug: subj: Game theory Nash equilibrium Parsimonious models Representation theory Probability theory keyword: Computation Correlated equilibrium Solution concepts Stackelberg mixed strategies Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium ab: It is sometimes the case that one solution concept in game theory is equivalent to applying another solution concept to a modified version of the game. In such cases, does it make sense to study the former separately (as it applies to the original representation of the game), or should we entirely subordinate it to the latter? The answer probably depends on the particular circumstances, and indeed the literature takes different approaches in different cases. In this article, I consider the specific example of Stackelberg mixed strategies. I argue that, even though a Stackelberg mixed strategy can also be seen as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a corresponding extensive-form game, there remains significant value in studying it separately. The analysis of this special case may have implications for other solution concepts. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2016. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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