Analog representations and their users.
Characterizing different kinds of representation is of fundamental importance to cognitive science, and one traditional way of doing so is in terms of the analog-digital distinction. Indeed the distinction is often appealed to in ways both narrow and broad. In this paper I argue that the analog-digi...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 193; no. 3; pp. 851 - 872 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Mar2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=113040245&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 113040245 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2016 vid: 193 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 113040245 10.1007/s11229-015-0774-5 ppf: 851 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 456KB tig: atl: Analog representations and their users. aug: au: Katz, Matthew affil: Department of Philosophy and Religion, Central Michigan University, 288 Anspach Hall Mt. Pleasant 48859 USA su: Cognitive science Representation (Philosophy) Analog-to-digital converters Central processing units Semantics (Philosophy) sug: subj: Cognitive science Representation (Philosophy) Analog-to-digital converters Central processing units Semantics (Philosophy) keyword: Analog Digital Representation ab: Characterizing different kinds of representation is of fundamental importance to cognitive science, and one traditional way of doing so is in terms of the analog-digital distinction. Indeed the distinction is often appealed to in ways both narrow and broad. In this paper I argue that the analog-digital distinction does not apply to representational schemes but only to representational systems, where a representational system is constituted by a representational scheme and its user, and that whether a representational system is analog or non-analog depends on facts about that user. This aspect of the distinction has gone unnoticed, and I argue that the failure to notice it can be an impediment to scientific progress. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2016. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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