THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BITCOIN.
The recent proliferation of bitcoin has been a boon for users but might pose problems for governments. Indeed, some governments have already taken steps to ban or discourage the use of bitcoin. In a model with endogenous matching and random consumption preferences, we find multiple monetary equilibr...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 54; no. 2; pp. 925 - 940 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Apr2016
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=113307259&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 113307259 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Apr2016 vid: 54 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 113307259 10.1111/ecin.12291 ppf: 925 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 289KB tig: atl: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BITCOIN. aug: au: Hendrickson, Joshua R. Hogan, Thomas L. Luther, William J. affil: Department of Economics, University of Mississippi, University MS, 38677 Johnson Center for Political Economy, Troy University, Troy AL, 36082 Department of Economics, Kenyon College, Gambier OH, 43022 su: Baidu Inc. Economic models Economics Government policy Bitcoin Digital currency laws Commodity futures Value-added tax sug: subj: Economic models Economics Government policy Baidu Inc. Commodity Contracts Dealing Commodity Contracts Brokerage Bitcoin Digital currency laws Commodity futures Value-added tax ab: The recent proliferation of bitcoin has been a boon for users but might pose problems for governments. Indeed, some governments have already taken steps to ban or discourage the use of bitcoin. In a model with endogenous matching and random consumption preferences, we find multiple monetary equilibria including one in which bitcoin coexists with official currency. We then identify the conditions under which government transactions policy might deter the use of bitcoin. We show that such a policy becomes more difficult if some users strictly prefer bitcoin because they can avoid other users holding the official currency in the matching process. ( JEL C78, E41, E42, E50) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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