MEASURING EFFORT INCENTIVES IN A TOURNAMENT WITH MANY PARTICIPANTS: THEORY AND APPLICATION.

This article provides an empirical measure to compare incentive effects of different tournament structures. Although there have been many theoretical attempts to analyze incentive effects of a tournament competition, empirical applications are limited as the provided conditions cannot easily be empi...

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Publicado en:Economic Inquiry Vol. 54; no. 2; pp. 1240 - 1251
Autores principales: Han, Chirok, Kang, Changhui, Lee, Sam ‐ Ho
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Apr2016
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: MEASURING EFFORT INCENTIVES IN A TOURNAMENT WITH MANY PARTICIPANTS: THEORY AND APPLICATION.
      aug:
        au:
          Han, Chirok
          Kang, Changhui
          Lee, Sam ‐ Ho
        affil:
          Professor, Department of Economics, Korea University, Seoul 02841 South Korea
          Professor, Department of Economics, Chung ‐ ang University, Seoul 06974 South Korea
          Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Korea University, Seoul 02841 South Korea
      su:
        Educational tests & measurements
        Participation
        Academic achievement
        Tournaments
        Academic ability
      sug:
        subj:
          Educational tests & measurements
          Participation
          Academic achievement
          Tournaments
          Academic ability
      ab: This article provides an empirical measure to compare incentive effects of different tournament structures. Although there have been many theoretical attempts to analyze incentive effects of a tournament competition, empirical applications are limited as the provided conditions cannot easily be empirically observed. We show that the empirical density of the performance distribution can be used to measure effort incentives in a tournament with many participants. We apply this method to evaluate the grading policy change in the 2008 College Scholastic Ability Test in South Korea. ( JEL C70, C51)
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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