Why Theories of Concepts Should Not Ignore the Problem of Acquisition.
A theory of conceptual development must provide an account of the innate representational repertoire, must characterize how these initial representations differ from the adult state, and must provide an account of the processes that transform the initial into mature representations. In The Origin of...
| Publicado en: | Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy Vol. 7; no. 41; pp. 113 - 164 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Paradigm Publishing Services
Nov2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=113309856&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 113309856 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 0873626X 1CM2 jtl: Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy issn: 0873626X maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Nov2015 vid: 7 iid: 41 pid: 35924 pub: Paradigm Publishing Services artinfo: ui: 113309856 10.2478/disp-2015-0008 ppf: 113 ppct: 51 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 2.4MB tig: atl: Why Theories of Concepts Should Not Ignore the Problem of Acquisition. aug: au: Carey, Susan affil: Harvard University su: Concept learning Conceptualism Cognitive science Morphemics Philosophy sug: subj: Concept learning Conceptualism Cognitive science Morphemics Philosophy keyword: Concept concept acquisition ab: A theory of conceptual development must provide an account of the innate representational repertoire, must characterize how these initial representations differ from the adult state, and must provide an account of the processes that transform the initial into mature representations. In The Origin of Concepts (Carey 2009), I defend three theses: (1) the initial state includes rich conceptual representations, (2) nonetheless, there are radical discontinuities between early and later developing conceptual systems, (3) Quinean bootstrapping is one learning mechanism that underlies the creation of new representational resources, enabling such discontinuity. Here I argue that the theory of conceptual development developed in The Origin of Concepts constrains our theories of concepts themselves, and addresses two of Fodor's challenges to cognitive science; namely, to show how learning could possibly lead to an increase in expressive power and to defeat Mad Dog Nativism, the thesis that all concepts lexicalized as mono-morphemic words are innate. In response to Fodor, I show that, and how, new primitives in a language of thought can be learned, that there are easy routes and hard ones to doing so, and that characterizing the learning mechanisms in each illuminates how conceptual role partially determines conceptual content. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Paradigm Publishing Services and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy holder: Paradigm Publishing Services dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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