Sources, reasons, and requirements.
This paper offers two competing accounts of normative requirements, each of which purports to explain why some-but not all-requirements are normative in the sense of being related to normative reasons in some robust way. According to the reasons- sensitive view, normative requirements are those and...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 173; no. 5; pp. 1253 - 1269 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
May2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=114077758&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 114077758 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2016 vid: 173 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 114077758 10.1007/s11098-015-0544-8 ppf: 1253 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 404KB tig: atl: Sources, reasons, and requirements. aug: au: Guindon, Bruno affil: University of British Columbia, Vancouver Canada su: Sensory perception Puzzles Attention Recognition (Philosophy) Identification sug: subj: Sensory perception Puzzles Attention Recognition (Philosophy) Identification keyword: Broome Normative requirements Reasons Sources ab: This paper offers two competing accounts of normative requirements, each of which purports to explain why some-but not all-requirements are normative in the sense of being related to normative reasons in some robust way. According to the reasons- sensitive view, normative requirements are those and only those which are sensitive to normative reasons. On this account, normative requirements are second-order statements about what there is conclusive reason to do, in the broad sense of the term. According to the reasons- providing view-which I attribute to John Broome-normative requirements are those and only those which constitute or provide normative reasons. I argue that the reasons-providing view is susceptible to two serious objections. First, the view generates an explanatory gap. Secondly, the view is implausible. I argue that these two objections give us reason to prefer the reasons-sensitive view of normative requirements over the reasons-providing view. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2016. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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