TYING THE KNOT: WHY REPRESENTATIONALISTS SHOULD ENDORSE THE SENSORIMOTOR THEORY OF CONSCIOUS FEEL.
The sensorimotor theory of perception and consciousness is frequently presented as a variety of antirepresentationalist cognitive science, and there is thus a temptation to suppose that those who take representation as bedrock should reject the approach. This paper argues that the sensorimotor appro...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 66; no. 263; pp. 280 - 302 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Apr2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=114196473&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 114196473 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318094 PHQ jtl: Philosophical Quarterly issn: 00318094 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2016 vid: 66 iid: 263 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 114196473 10.1093/pq/pqv097 ppf: 280 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 540KB tig: atl: TYING THE KNOT: WHY REPRESENTATIONALISTS SHOULD ENDORSE THE SENSORIMOTOR THEORY OF CONSCIOUS FEEL. aug: au: SILVERMAN, DAVID affil: Paris Descartes University, France su: Sensorimotor integration Consciousness Cognitive science Representation (Philosophy) Qualia sug: subj: Sensorimotor integration Consciousness Cognitive science Representation (Philosophy) Qualia keyword: consciousness enactivism phenomenal qualities qualia representationalism sensorimotor theory ab: The sensorimotor theory of perception and consciousness is frequently presented as a variety of antirepresentationalist cognitive science, and there is thus a temptation to suppose that those who take representation as bedrock should reject the approach. This paper argues that the sensorimotor approach is compatible with representationalism, and moreover that representationalism about phenomenal qualities, such as that advocated by Tye, would be more complete and less vulnerable to criticism if it incorporated the sensorimotor account of conscious feel. The paper concludes by arguing that the project of naturalizing phenomenal qualities would nonetheless be better served by abandoning 'representation' talk altogether, a move that would require only a small modification of existing representationalist accounts. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews. item: Philosophical Quarterly holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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