SUBJEKTO SAMPRATA SCHELLINGO TRANSCENDENTALINIAME IDEALIZME IR RACIONALAUS IDEALIZMO KRITIKOJE: LYGINAMOJI ANALIZĖ.
The aim of this article is to define certain distinctive features of the conception of the subject in Schelling's rational transcendental idealism and in his later critique of rational idealism. By invoking a comparative analysis we point to the course of Schelling's general theoretical development...
| Publicado en: | Problems / Problemos Vol. 89; pp. 141 - 153 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Vilnius University
2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | The aim of this article is to define certain distinctive features of the conception of the subject in Schelling's rational transcendental idealism and in his later critique of rational idealism. By invoking a comparative analysis we point to the course of Schelling's general theoretical development which inevitably affected his conceptual approach to the problem of subjectivity. We show that in the period of rational idealism the subject is defined as reasonable, autonomous agent of transcendental determinations, whereas in the period of critique of rational idealism it refers to peculiar mental reality, which is characterized by epistemological and ontological insufficiency of intelligibility, reason and consciousness itself. Therefore in the period of critique of rational idealism the conception of the subject is shown to be limited and conditioned by positive components of object-oriented being which are ontologically opposed to the philosopheme of self-sufficient intelligibility. Šiame straipsnyje siekiama apibrėžti konkrečius skiriamuosius subjekto sampratos bruožus Schellingo racionaliajame transcendentaliniame idealizme ir vėlesnėje racionalaus idealizmo kritikoje. Pasitelkdami lyginamąją analizę mes žvelgiame į bendresnio pobūdžio Schellingo teorinių pozicijų raidą, kuri neišvengiamai darė įtaką konceptualiai prieigai prie subjektyvumo problematikos. Parodome, kad racionalaus idealizmo laikotarpiu subjektas apibūdinamas kaip protingas, savaveiksmis transcendentalinių apibrėžimų agentas, o racionalaus idealizmo kritikos periodu subjektu vadinama savita mentalinė realybė, kuri pasižymi epistemologiniu ir ontologiniu inteligibilumo, proto bei pačios sąmonės nepakankamumu. Taigi, racionalaus idealizmo kritikos periodu subjekto sąvoka suprantama kaip ribojama ir sąlygojama tokių pozityvių objektinės būties sandų, kurie yra ontologiškai priešingi savo paties atžvilgiu pakankamu laikomo inteligibilumo filosofemai. |
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