What Sort of Collective Afterlife Matters and How.
In Death and the Afterlife, Samuel Scheffler argues that the assumption of a 'collective afterlife' (i.e., the assumption that the human race and humanity lives on after our own individual deaths) plays an essential role in us valuing much of what we do. If a collective afterlife did not exist, our...
| Publicado en: | Philosophia Vol. 44; no. 1; pp. 87 - 101 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Mar2016
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=114512376&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 114512376 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00483893 1VPF jtl: Philosophia issn: 00483893 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2016 vid: 44 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 114512376 10.1007/s11406-015-9659-6 ppf: 87 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 310KB tig: atl: What Sort of Collective Afterlife Matters and How. aug: au: Blumenthal-Barby, J. affil: Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Baylor College of Medicine, Department of Philosophy, Rice University, Room 310D One Baylor Plaza Houston 77030 USA su: Death & the Afterlife (Book) Scheffler, Samuel Afterlife Meaning (Philosophy) Death sug: subj: Death & the Afterlife (Book) Scheffler, Samuel Afterlife Meaning (Philosophy) Death keyword: Collective afterlife Meaning Value theory ab: In Death and the Afterlife, Samuel Scheffler argues that the assumption of a 'collective afterlife' (i.e., the assumption that the human race and humanity lives on after our own individual deaths) plays an essential role in us valuing much of what we do. If a collective afterlife did not exist, our value structures would be radically different according to Scheffler. We would cease to value much of what we do. In Part I of the paper, I argue that there is something to Scheffler's afterlife conjecture, but that Scheffler has misplaced the mattering of a collective afterlife. Its significance lies not in the realm of axiology but more importantly in coming to terms with the fact of death and in viewing our lives as having meaning. In Part II of the paper, I outline three views on the sort of collective afterlife that matters and argue in favor of the view that it must involve creatures that recognize our existence, reasons, values, and contributions ('The Recognition Thesis') and the view that it must involve creatures that value similar things to us ('The Valuers Like Us Thesis')-but argue against the view that it necessarily be a human collective afterlife ('The Human Form Thesis'). pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophia is a copyright of Springer, 2016. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophia holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|