Wittgensteinian Pragmatism in Humean Concepts.

David Hume's and later Ludwig Wittgenstein's views on concepts are generally presented as standing in stark opposition to each other. In a nutshell, Hume's theory of concepts is taken to be subjectivistic and atomistic, while Wittgenstein is metonymic with a broadly pragmatistic and holistic doctrin...

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Publicado en:Philosophia Vol. 44; no. 1; pp. 117 - 136
Autor principal: Hommen, David
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Mar2016
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Hume, David, 1711-1776
        Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951
        Concepts
        Subjectivity
        Logical atomism
        Psychology & philosophy
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          Hume, David, 1711-1776
          Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951
          Concepts
          Subjectivity
          Logical atomism
          Psychology & philosophy
      keyword:
        Cognitive epistemology
        Hume
        Pragmatism
        Wittgenstein
      ab: David Hume's and later Ludwig Wittgenstein's views on concepts are generally presented as standing in stark opposition to each other. In a nutshell, Hume's theory of concepts is taken to be subjectivistic and atomistic, while Wittgenstein is metonymic with a broadly pragmatistic and holistic doctrine that gained much attention during the second half of the 20th century. In this essay, I shall argue, however, that Hume's theory of concepts is indeed much more akin to the views of (post-Tractarian) Wittgenstein and his epigones than many, including Wittgenstein himself, probably might have suspected. As I try to show, Hume anticipates many themes central to Wittgenstein's writings on language and meaning, and actually takes initial steps towards both an anti-subjectivistic and anti-atomistic psychology and epistemology.
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