The Self-Evidencing Brain.
An exciting theory in neuroscience is that the brain is an organ for prediction error minimization (PEM). This theory is rapidly gaining influence and is set to dominate the science of mind and brain in the years to come. PEM has extreme explanatory ambition, and profound philosophical implications....
| Publicado en: | Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 50; no. 2; pp. 259 - 286 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=114785805&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 114785805 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00294624 D97 jtl: Nous (0029-4624) issn: 00294624 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2016 vid: 50 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 114785805 10.1111/nous.12062 ppf: 259 ppct: 27 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 190KB tig: atl: The Self-Evidencing Brain. aug: au: Hohwy, Jakob affil: Monash University su: Neurosciences Skepticism Cognition Cognitive ability Cognitive development sug: subj: Neurosciences Skepticism Cognition Cognitive ability Cognitive development ab: An exciting theory in neuroscience is that the brain is an organ for prediction error minimization (PEM). This theory is rapidly gaining influence and is set to dominate the science of mind and brain in the years to come. PEM has extreme explanatory ambition, and profound philosophical implications. Here, I assume the theory, briefly explain it, and then I argue that PEM implies that the brain is essentially self-evidencing. This means it is imperative to identify an evidentiary boundary between the brain and its environment. This boundary defines the mind-world relation, opens the door to skepticism, and makes the mind transpire as more inferentially secluded and neurocentrically skull-bound than many would nowadays think. Therefore, PEM somewhat deflates contemporary hypotheses that cognition is extended, embodied and enactive; however, it can nevertheless accommodate the kinds of cases that fuel these hypotheses. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Nous (0029-4624) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Nous (0029-4624) holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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