Investigating neural representations: the tale of place cells.

While neuroscientists often characterize brain activity as representational, many philosophers have construed these accounts as just theorists' glosses on the mechanism. Moreover, philosophical discussions commonly focus on finished accounts of explanation, not research in progress. I adopt a differ...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 193; no. 5; pp. 1287 - 1322
Autor principal: Bechtel, William
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature May2016
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Bechtel, William
        affil: Department of Philosophy, Center for Chronobiology, and Interdisciplinary Program in Cognitive Science, University of California, La Jolla San Diego 92093-0119 USA
      su:
        Representation (Philosophy)
        Grid cells
        Neurosciences
        Mechanism (Philosophy)
        Information processing
        Hippocampus (Brain)
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        subj:
          Representation (Philosophy)
          Grid cells
          Neurosciences
          Mechanism (Philosophy)
          Information processing
          Hippocampus (Brain)
      keyword:
        Mechanistic explanations
        Place cells
        Representations
        Spatial navigation
      ab: While neuroscientists often characterize brain activity as representational, many philosophers have construed these accounts as just theorists' glosses on the mechanism. Moreover, philosophical discussions commonly focus on finished accounts of explanation, not research in progress. I adopt a different perspective, considering how characterizations of neural activity as representational contributes to the development of mechanistic accounts, guiding the investigations neuroscientists pursue as they work from an initial proposal to a more detailed understanding of a mechanism. I develop one illustrative example involving research on the information-processing mechanisms mammals employ in navigating their environments. This research was galvanized by the discovery in the 1970s of place cells in the hippocampus. This discovery prompted research in what the activity of these cells represents and how place representations figure in navigation. It also led to the discovery of a host of other types of neurons-grid cells, head-direction cells, boundary cells-that carry other types of spatial information and interact with place cells in the mechanism underlying spatial navigation. As I will try to make clear, the research is explicitly devoted to identifying representations and determining how they are constructed and used in an information processing mechanism. Construals of neural activity as representations are not mere glosses but are characterizations to which neuroscientists are committed in the development of their explanatory accounts.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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    language: English
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