Hookway's Peirce on Assertion & Truth.
Charles Sanders Peirce famously claimed that 'The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth' (W3: 273). Christopher Hookway has argued for a highly distinctive interpretation of this claim in terms of speech-acts and the normative commitmen...
| Publicado en: | Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society Vol. 51; no. 4; pp. 419 - 444 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Indiana University Press
Winter2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=115099027&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 115099027 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00091774 2HR jtl: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society issn: 00091774 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Winter2015 vid: 51 iid: 4 pid: 211 pub: Indiana University Press artinfo: ui: 115099027 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.51.4.03 ppf: 419 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 627KB tig: atl: Hookway's Peirce on Assertion & Truth. aug: au: Howat, Andrew W. affil: California State University, Fullerton, su: Hookway, Christopher Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914 Semantics Pragmatism Assertiveness (Psychology) sug: subj: Hookway, Christopher Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914 Semantics Pragmatism Assertiveness (Psychology) keyword: Assertion Convergence Hookway Peirce Pragmatics Science Speech-acts Theory vs. Practice Truth ab: Charles Sanders Peirce famously claimed that 'The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth' (W3: 273). Christopher Hookway has argued for a highly distinctive interpretation of this claim in terms of speech-acts and the normative commitments we incur in performing them.2 So-construed, Peirce's conception of truth is difficult to compare with standard theories of the concept, which tend to focus instead upon some property or feature that is shared by all and only true propositions, and with whether or not that property is substantive or metaphysically significant. This paper examines Hookway's interpretation of Peirce's conception of truth in an effort to clarify its position in logical space. It then raises some difficulties for the way Hookway tries to accommodate Peirce's remarks about the special status of assertion and belief in science. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society is the property of Indiana University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society holder: Indiana University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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