Corrective vs. Distributive Justice: the Case of Apologies.

This paper considers the relation of corrective to distributive justice. I discuss the shortfalls of one sort of account that holds these are independent domains of justice. To support a more modest claim that these are sometimes independent domains of justice, I focus instead on the case of apologi...

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Published in:Ethical Theory & Moral Practice Vol. 19; no. 3; pp. 663 - 678
Main Author: Cohen, Andrew
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature Jun2016
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        10.1007/s10677-015-9674-5
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        atl: Corrective vs. Distributive Justice: the Case of Apologies.
      aug:
        au: Cohen, Andrew
        affil: Jean Beer Blumenfeld Center for Ethics, Department of Philosophy, Georgia State University, Atlanta 30302-3994 USA
      su:
        Corrective justice
        Distributive justice
        Apologizing
        Jurisprudence
        Legal ethics
      sug:
        subj:
          Corrective justice
          Distributive justice
          Apologizing
          Jurisprudence
          Legal ethics
      keyword:
        Apologies
        Compensation
        Reparations
      ab: This paper considers the relation of corrective to distributive justice. I discuss the shortfalls of one sort of account that holds these are independent domains of justice. To support a more modest claim that these are sometimes independent domains of justice, I focus instead on the case of apologies. Apologies are sometimes among the measures specified by corrective justice. I argue that the sorts of injustices that apologies can help to correct need not always be departures from ideals specified by distributive justice. Apologies and the moral relations they engage might thus be parts of a domain of justice that is neither distributive nor dependent on distributive justice.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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      custom: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice is a copyright of Springer, 2016. All Rights Reserved.
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