The moment of self-transformation: Kierkegaard on suffering and the subject.
In his self-published periodical The Moment, Søren Kierkegaard warns his reader against the possibility of 'useless suffering' ( unyttig Lidelse). Not only that, he urges the reader to make use of her suffering. Taking this caution as a point of departure, I investigate the pseudonymous Johannes Cli...
| Publicado en: | Continental Philosophy Review Vol. 49; no. 2; pp. 161 - 181 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=116101465&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 116101465 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13872842 OEF jtl: Continental Philosophy Review issn: 13872842 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2016 vid: 49 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 116101465 10.1007/s11007-016-9379-z ppf: 161 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 478KB tig: atl: The moment of self-transformation: Kierkegaard on suffering and the subject. aug: au: Cuff Snow, Samuel su: Kierkegaard, Søren, 1813-1855 Suffering Dialectic Subjectivity Existence theorems sug: subj: Kierkegaard, Søren, 1813-1855 Suffering Dialectic Subjectivity Existence theorems keyword: Inverse dialectic Kierkegaard Levinas Self-other relations The moment Upbuilding Useless suffering ab: In his self-published periodical The Moment, Søren Kierkegaard warns his reader against the possibility of 'useless suffering' ( unyttig Lidelse). Not only that, he urges the reader to make use of her suffering. Taking this caution as a point of departure, I investigate the pseudonymous Johannes Climacus' deliberations on ethico-religious suffering in the Postscript. I demonstrate that Climacus construes suffering as useful, and with that outlines an economy of suffering that Kierkegaard delineates across his pseudonymous and non-pseudonymous work. The paradigmatic expression of this is the use the subject makes of her suffering in 'the moment' ( Øieblikket), in which suffering is defined according to its relation with the eternal. Suffering is thus a key element of the individual subject's self-development: The subject is transformed, and transforms herself, in suffering. Finally, I argue that this economy of suffering produces a notion of the subject as actively involved in securing the contribution her suffering can make to her self-transformation. I criticize this notion, showing it renders problematic any ethical or ethico-religious account of the response of the subject to the suffering of the other: The subject is not first and foremost attuned to the other's suffering, rather she is attuned to the possibility of her own transformation. Suffering becomes in this way both a key exegetical tool for understanding Kierkegaard's view of the subject and, more significantly, a way to problematize Kierkegaard's ethical account of the subject's response to others' suffering. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Continental Philosophy Review is a copyright of Springer, 2016. All Rights Reserved. item: Continental Philosophy Review holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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