Bayesian Humility.
Say that an agent is epistemically humble if she is less than fully confident that her opinions will converge to the truth, given appropriate evidence. Is such humility rationally permissible? According to Gordon Belot's orgulity argument: the answer is yes, but long-run convergence-to-the-truth the...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 83; no. 3; pp. 305 - 324 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jul2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=116343402&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 116343402 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2016 vid: 83 iid: 3 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 116343402 10.1086/685740 ppf: 305 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 684KB tig: atl: Bayesian Humility. aug: au: Elga, Adam su: Bayesian analysis Theory of knowledge Truthfulness & falsehood Belot, Gordon Reasoning Persuasion (Rhetoric) sug: subj: Bayesian analysis Theory of knowledge Truthfulness & falsehood Belot, Gordon Reasoning Persuasion (Rhetoric) ab: Say that an agent is epistemically humble if she is less than fully confident that her opinions will converge to the truth, given appropriate evidence. Is such humility rationally permissible? According to Gordon Belot's orgulity argument: the answer is yes, but long-run convergence-to-the-truth theorems force Bayesians to answer no. That argument has no force against Bayesians who reject countable additivity as a requirement of rationality. Such Bayesians are free to count even extreme humility as rationally permissible. Furthermore, dropping countable additivity does not render Bayesianism more vulnerable to the charge that it is excessively subjective. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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