Chimps as secret agents.
We provide an account of chimpanzee-specific agency within the context of philosophy of action. We do so by showing that chimpanzees are capable of what we call reason-directed action, even though they may be incapable of more full-blown action, which we call reason-considered action. Although chimp...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 193; no. 7; pp. 2129 - 2159 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Jul2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=116622503&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 116622503 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2016 vid: 193 iid: 7 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 116622503 10.1007/s11229-015-0835-9 ppf: 2129 ppct: 30 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 852KB tig: atl: Chimps as secret agents. aug: au: Arruda, Caroline Povinelli, Daniel affil: Department of Philosophy, The University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso 79902 USA Department of Biology, University of Louisiana, 104 E University Ave Lafayette 70504 USA su: Chimpanzees Philosophy Reason Agency theory Biological evolution sug: subj: Chimpanzees Philosophy Reason Agency theory Biological evolution keyword: Animal agency Animal minds Animal reasoning ab: We provide an account of chimpanzee-specific agency within the context of philosophy of action. We do so by showing that chimpanzees are capable of what we call reason-directed action, even though they may be incapable of more full-blown action, which we call reason-considered action. Although chimpanzee agency does not possess all the features of typical adult human agency, chimpanzee agency is evolutionarily responsive to their environment and overlaps considerably with our own. As such, it is an evolved set of capacities for goal-directed behavior, which solves problems that chimpanzees (and humans) naturally encounter. Thus, it ought not be understood as a deficient instance of human agency. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2016. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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