Epistemic logic meets epistemic game theory: a comparison between multi-agent Kripke models and type spaces.
In the literature there are at least two main formal structures to deal with situations of interactive epistemology: Kripke models and type spaces. As shown in many papers (see Aumann and Brandenburger in Econometrica 36:1161-1180, ; Baltag et al. in Synthese 169:301-333, ; Battigalli and Bonanno in...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 193; no. 7; pp. 2097 - 2128 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jul2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=116622504&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 116622504 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2016 vid: 193 iid: 7 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 116622504 10.1007/s11229-015-0834-x ppf: 2097 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 832KB tig: atl: Epistemic logic meets epistemic game theory: a comparison between multi-agent Kripke models and type spaces. aug: au: Galeazzi, Paolo Lorini, Emiliano affil: ILLC, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam The Netherlands IRIT-CNRS, Toulouse University, Toulouse France su: Theory of knowledge Semantics Logic Game theory Belief & doubt sug: subj: Theory of knowledge Semantics Logic Game theory Belief & doubt keyword: Epistemic game theory Epistemic logic Interactive epistemology STIT logic Type space ab: In the literature there are at least two main formal structures to deal with situations of interactive epistemology: Kripke models and type spaces. As shown in many papers (see Aumann and Brandenburger in Econometrica 36:1161-1180, ; Baltag et al. in Synthese 169:301-333, ; Battigalli and Bonanno in Res Econ 53(2):149-225, ; Battigalli and Siniscalchi in J Econ Theory 106:356-391, ; Klein and Pacuit in Stud Log 102:297-319, ; Lorini in J Philos Log 42(6):863-904, ), both these frameworks can be used to express epistemic conditions for solution concepts in game theory. The main result of this paper is a formal comparison between the two and a statement of semantic equivalence with respect to two different logical systems: a doxastic logic for belief and an epistemic-doxastic logic for belief and knowledge. Moreover, a sound and complete axiomatization of these logics with respect to the two equivalent Kripke semantics and type spaces semantics is provided. Finally, a probabilistic extension of the result is also presented. A further result of the paper is a study of the relationship between the epistemic-doxastic logic for belief and knowledge and the logic STIT (the logic of 'seeing to it that') by Belnap and colleagues (Facing the future: agents and choices in our indeterminist world, ). pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2016. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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