Carving Intuition at its Joints.
A central metaphilosophical project seeks to evaluate the reliability of the types of evidence that figure in philosophical arguments and, relatedly, the justificatory status of relying on those types of evidence. Traditionally, metaphilosophers have approached this project via an analysis of intuit...
| Publicado en: | Metaphilosophy Vol. 47; no. 3; pp. 326 - 353 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=116661503&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 116661503 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00261068 9OM jtl: Metaphilosophy issn: 00261068 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jul2016 vid: 47 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 116661503 10.1111/meta.12193 ppf: 326 ppct: 27 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 154KB tig: atl: Carving Intuition at its Joints. aug: au: Schukraft, Jason affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin, 2210 Speedway, Stop C3500, Austin TX, 78712, USA su: Intuition Exoticism Heterogeneous computing Criminal intent Sensitivity analysis sug: subj: Intuition Exoticism Heterogeneous computing Criminal intent Sensitivity analysis keyword: intuition metaphilosophy philosophical methodology ab: A central metaphilosophical project seeks to evaluate the reliability of the types of evidence that figure in philosophical arguments and, relatedly, the justificatory status of relying on those types of evidence. Traditionally, metaphilosophers have approached this project via an analysis of intuition. This article argues that the category picked out by 'intuition' is both too broad and too heterogeneous to serve as the appropriate target for metaphilosophical inquiry. Intuition is a gerrymandered and disjunctive kind, undeserving of the widespread attention it receives in the literature. Instead, metaphilosophers should examine more finely grained mental states. Three promising strategies for parsing intuitions more finely are proposed: by their causal origins, by their context of employment, and by the exoticism of their content. This more narrow focus may significantly alter the dialectic in three prominent metaphilosophical arguments: the argument from calibration, the argument from self-defeat, and the argument from intuitional sensitivity. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Metaphilosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Metaphilosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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