Information Effects in Uniform Price Multi-Unit Dutch Auctions.
We design a multi-unit descending-price (Dutch) auction mechanism that has applications for resource allocation and pricing problems. We address specific auction design choices by theoretically and experimentally determining optimal information disclosure along two dimensions. Bidders are either inf...
| Publicado en: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 83; no. 1; pp. 126 - 146 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2016
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=116708218&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 116708218 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2016 vid: 83 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 116708218 10.1002/soej.12145 ppf: 126 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 453KB tig: atl: Information Effects in Uniform Price Multi-Unit Dutch Auctions. aug: au: Buchanan, Joy Gjerstad, Steven Porter, David affil: George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, 4400 University Drive, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, USA su: Commercial law Auctions Sales Bidders Bid price Bidding strategies sug: subj: Commercial law Auctions Sales Bidders Bid price Bidding strategies keyword: C9 D02 D44 C9 D02 D44 ab: We design a multi-unit descending-price (Dutch) auction mechanism that has applications for resource allocation and pricing problems. We address specific auction design choices by theoretically and experimentally determining optimal information disclosure along two dimensions. Bidders are either informed of the number of bidders in the auction, or know that it is one of two possible sizes; they also either know the number of units remaining for sale or are unaware of how many units have been taken by other bidders. We find that revealing group size decreases bids, and therefore revenue, if units remaining are not shown. When group size is unknown the price also falls if the number of units remaining is revealed. The most efficient and largest revenue outcome occurs when bidders are not provided information on either group size or units remaining. These laboratory results conform to some directional predictions from our theory, although overbidding is common. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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