Conservatism and Uniqueness.

Credal Conservatism says that an agent's credal states should be conserved as far as possible when she undergoes a learning experience. Uniqueness says that for any given total evidence, there is a unique credal state that any agent with that total evidence should have. Epistemic Impartiality is the...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 173; no. 8; pp. 2233 - 2249
Autor principal: Jung, Jaemin
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Aug2016
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=116709646&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 116709646
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00318116
        4L8
      jtl: Philosophical Studies
      issn: 00318116
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Aug2016
      vid: 173
      iid: 8
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        116709646
        10.1007/s11098-015-0606-y
      ppf: 2233
      ppct: 16
      formats:
        fmt:
          @attributes:
            type: P
            size: 502KB
      tig:
        atl: Conservatism and Uniqueness.
      aug:
        au: Jung, Jaemin
        affil: Philosophy, SHPRS, Arizona State University, Tempe 85287-3902 USA
      su:
        Conservatism
        Uniqueness (Philosophy)
        Epistemics
        Theory of knowledge
        Rationalism
      sug:
        subj:
          Conservatism
          Uniqueness (Philosophy)
          Epistemics
          Theory of knowledge
          Rationalism
      keyword:
        Credal Conservatism
        Epistemic Impartiality
        Permissivism
        Uniqueness
      ab: Credal Conservatism says that an agent's credal states should be conserved as far as possible when she undergoes a learning experience. Uniqueness says that for any given total evidence, there is a unique credal state that any agent with that total evidence should have. Epistemic Impartiality is the idea that there are no significant differences between intrapersonal and interpersonal rationality requirements when determining what credal states one ought to have for purposes of epistemic evaluation. I construe Epistemic Impartiality as a meta-principle governing epistemic norms, and argue that it is compatible with Conservatism. Then I show that on the assumption of Epistemic Impartiality, Credal Conservatism is equivalent to Uniqueness.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2016. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Philosophical Studies
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2016
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N