Is Having Pets Morally Permissible?
In this article, I consider the question of whether having pets is morally permissible. However, I do so indirectly by considering three objections to the practice of having pets - what I shall call the 'restriction of freedom objection', the 'property objection', and the 'dependency objection'. The...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Applied Philosophy Vol. 33; no. 3; pp. 327 - 344 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Aug2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=116935867&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 116935867 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 02643758 BQ0 jtl: Journal of Applied Philosophy issn: 02643758 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Aug2016 vid: 33 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 116935867 10.1111/japp.12106 ppf: 327 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 500KB tig: atl: Is Having Pets Morally Permissible? aug: au: Toit, Jessica affil: Department of Bioethics, National Institutes of Health, 10 Center Drive, Building 10, Room 1C118, Bethesda MD, 20892‐1156, USA Philosophy Department, University of Cape Town, Private Bag X3, Rondebosch 7701, South Africa su: Pets Ethics Liberty Choice (Psychology) Domestic animals sug: subj: Pets Ethics Liberty Choice (Psychology) Domestic animals ab: In this article, I consider the question of whether having pets is morally permissible. However, I do so indirectly by considering three objections to the practice of having pets - what I shall call the 'restriction of freedom objection', the 'property objection', and the 'dependency objection'. The restriction of freedom objection is dismissed relatively easily. The property objection also fails to show that having pets is morally impermissible. However, my consideration of this second objection does lead to the conclusion that we ought to aim at changing existing legal systems and the majority of people's attitudes towards pets such that they (pets) are no longer considered to be the personal property of the humans in whose homes they are kept. But, while it is clear that we ought to aim at ending the practice of owning pets, it is not clear whether we ought to aim at ending the practice of keeping pets. Indeed, I do not to reach a definitive conclusion about the cogency of the dependency objection. However, I argue that this lack of clarity is of little concern at this time as our present moral obligations to pets are quite clear. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Journal of Applied Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Journal of Applied Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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