A Dilemma for the Doomsday Argument.

I present a new case in which the Doomsday Argument (' DA') runs afoul of epistemic intuition much more strongly than before. This leads to a dilemma: in the new case either DA is committed to unacceptable counterintuitiveness and belief in miracles, or else it is irrelevant. I then explore under wh...

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Publicado en:Ratio Vol. 29; no. 3; pp. 268 - 283
Autor principal: Northcott, Robert
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Sep2016
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: A Dilemma for the Doomsday Argument.
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        au: Northcott, Robert
        affil: Department of Philosophy, Birkbeck College, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX
      su:
        Judgment Day
        Afterlife
        A priori
        Probability theory
        Uncertainty
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          Judgment Day
          Afterlife
          A priori
          Probability theory
          Uncertainty
      ab: I present a new case in which the Doomsday Argument (' DA') runs afoul of epistemic intuition much more strongly than before. This leads to a dilemma: in the new case either DA is committed to unacceptable counterintuitiveness and belief in miracles, or else it is irrelevant. I then explore under what conditions DA can escape this dilemma. The discussion turns on several issues that have not been much emphasised in previous work on DA: a concern that I label trumping; the degree of uncertainty about relevant probability estimates; and the exact sequence in which we integrate DA and empirical concerns. I conclude that only given a particular configuration of these factors might DA still be of interest.
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