Numb Networks.
In this response to “Whitman’s Sympathies” by Jane Bennett, I show how Whitman broke with Romantic poetic convention by representing sympathy as an involuntary, embodied affect—as, in Bennett’s terms, “(onto)Sympathy.” However, as I argue, the ontology of Whitmanian sympathy undermines the notion of...
| Publicado en: | Political Research Quarterly Vol. 69; no. 3; pp. 626 - 633 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Sage Publications Inc.
Sep2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=117099203&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 117099203 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 10659129 PTQ jtl: Political Research Quarterly issn: 10659129 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2016 vid: 69 iid: 3 pid: 344 pub: Sage Publications Inc. artinfo: ui: 117099203 10.1177/1065912916657187 ppf: 626 ppct: 7 formats: tig: atl: Numb Networks. aug: au: Ellis, Cristin affil: University of Mississippi, Oxford, USA su: Whitman, Walt, 1819-1892 Bennett, Jane Sympathy Identity (Psychology) Ontology Posthumanism sug: subj: Sympathy Identity (Psychology) Ontology Posthumanism Whitman, Walt, 1819-1892 Bennett, Jane keyword: identity new materialism posthumanism race sympathy identity new materialism posthumanism race sympathy ab: In this response to “Whitman’s Sympathies” by Jane Bennett, I show how Whitman broke with Romantic poetic convention by representing sympathy as an involuntary, embodied affect—as, in Bennett’s terms, “(onto)Sympathy.” However, as I argue, the ontology of Whitmanian sympathy undermines the notion of individual identity—of autonomy, singularity, and difference—upon which sympathy’s traditionally inclusive, pluralist politics depends. Instead of persons and interpersonal ethical relations, Whitmanian sympathy conjures a networked and processual ontology in which discrete entities cannot finally be distinguished. Thus, I argue that Bennett’s notion of “(onto)Sympathy” is incommensurable with the syntax of individual identity and (race, sex, gender, class, species) difference. But even if this makes it incompatible with a politics of recognition, I argue that this networked ontology may nevertheless be strategically better adapted to address the political challenges of ecological crisis. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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