INTEGRATING MARKET ALTERNATIVES INTO THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF OPTIMAL DETERRENCE.

Leading economic models of crime assume that potential criminals achieve their ends by criminal means or not at all. We develop a framework in which potential criminals can also attain their objectives through voluntary trade. Our framework helps explain several features of the legal system that hav...

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Publicado en:Economic Inquiry Vol. 54; no. 4; pp. 1873 - 1884
Autores principales: Curry, Philip A., Doyle, Matthew
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Oct2016
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: INTEGRATING MARKET ALTERNATIVES INTO THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF OPTIMAL DETERRENCE.
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          Curry, Philip A.
          Doyle, Matthew
        affil:
          Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Waterloo, Waterloo N2L 3G1, Canada
          Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of Waterloo, Waterloo N2L 3G1, Canada
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        Economic models
        Criminal records
        Commerce
        Law enforcement
        Punishment
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          Economic models
          Criminal records
          Commerce
          Law enforcement
          Punishment
          Police Protection
          Other Justice, Public Order, and Safety Activities
      ab: Leading economic models of crime assume that potential criminals achieve their ends by criminal means or not at all. We develop a framework in which potential criminals can also attain their objectives through voluntary trade. Our framework helps explain several features of the legal system that have proven to be problematic for the canonical approach: why optimal sanctions should be increasing in an individual's criminal history, and why necessity may be a partial defense in some situations. Finally, the inclusion of a voluntary trade option makes the maximization of a utilitarian welfare function identical to minimizing the costs of crime, implying that a long-standing controversy in the literature is, in part, an artifact of the assumption that criminals face a binary choice set. ( JEL K42, D60, H00)
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    language: English
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