What is it like to be the Metaphysical Subject? An Essay on Early Wittgenstein, our Epistemic Position, and Beyond.
I argue that Ludwig Wittgenstein's idea of the metaphysical subject sheds new light on subjective qualities of experience. In this article I draw first of all on the interpretations provided by Michael Kremer and James Conant. Subsequently, I conclude that 'what is it like' means primarily 'what is...
| Publicado en: | Philosophia Vol. 44; no. 3; pp. 921 - 947 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Sep2016
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | I argue that Ludwig Wittgenstein's idea of the metaphysical subject sheds new light on subjective qualities of experience. In this article I draw first of all on the interpretations provided by Michael Kremer and James Conant. Subsequently, I conclude that 'what is it like' means primarily 'what is it like to see myself as the metaphysical subject'. |
|---|