The Form of Practical Knowledge and Implicit Cognition: A Critique of Kantian Constitutivism.
Moral realism faces two worries: How can we have knowledge of moral norms if they are independent of us, and why should we care about them if they are independent of rational activities they govern? Kantian constitutivism tackles both worries simultaneously by claiming that practical norms are const...
| Publicado en: | Social Theory & Practice Vol. 42; no. 4; pp. 733 - 748 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Florida State University
Oct2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=118092657&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 118092657 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 0037802X STP jtl: Social Theory & Practice issn: 0037802X maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2016 vid: 42 iid: 4 pid: 150 pub: Florida State University artinfo: ui: 118092657 10.5840/soctheorpract201642425 ppf: 733 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 4.4MB tig: atl: The Form of Practical Knowledge and Implicit Cognition: A Critique of Kantian Constitutivism. aug: au: Saemi, Amir affil: Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM), Tehran su: Engstrom, Stephen Cognition Kantian ethics Moral realism Practical judgment sug: subj: Cognition Kantian ethics Moral realism Practical judgment Engstrom, Stephen keyword: cognition constitutivism Engstrom epistemological problem Kant normative problem practical knowledge reason universality will cognition constitutivism Engstrom epistemological problem Kant normative problem practical knowledge reason universality will ab: Moral realism faces two worries: How can we have knowledge of moral norms if they are independent of us, and why should we care about them if they are independent of rational activities they govern? Kantian constitutivism tackles both worries simultaneously by claiming that practical norms are constitutive principles of practical reason. In particular, on Stephen Engstrom's account, willing involves making a practical judgment. To will well, and thus to have practical knowledge (i.e., knowledge of what is good), the content of one's will needs to conform to the formal presuppositions of practical knowledge. Practical norms are thus constitutive of practical knowledge. However, I will argue that the universality principles from which Engstrom derives the formal presuppositions of practical knowledge are reflectively and psychologically unavailable. As a result, they cannot help Kantian constitutivism provide an answer to moral realism's worries. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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