Fallibilism, closure, and pragmatic encroachment.
I argue that fallibilism, single-premise epistemic closure, and one formulation of the 'knowledge-action principle' are inconsistent. I will consider a possible way to avoid this incompatibility, by advocating a pragmatic constraint on belief in general, rather than just knowledge. But I will conclu...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 173; no. 10; pp. 2745 - 2758 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Oct2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=118192599&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 118192599 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2016 vid: 173 iid: 10 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 118192599 10.1007/s11098-016-0631-5 ppf: 2745 ppct: 13 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 390KB tig: atl: Fallibilism, closure, and pragmatic encroachment. aug: au: Zweber, Adam affil: Department of Philosophy , Western Michigan University , Kalamazoo 49008-5328 USA su: Fallibilism Theory of knowledge Pragmatics Inconsistency (Logic) Fantl, Jeremy sug: subj: Fallibilism Theory of knowledge Pragmatics Inconsistency (Logic) Fantl, Jeremy keyword: Epistemic closure Jeremy Fantl Matthew McGrath Pragmatic encroachment ab: I argue that fallibilism, single-premise epistemic closure, and one formulation of the 'knowledge-action principle' are inconsistent. I will consider a possible way to avoid this incompatibility, by advocating a pragmatic constraint on belief in general, rather than just knowledge. But I will conclude that this is not a promising option for defusing the problem. I do not argue here for any one way of resolving the inconsistency. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2016. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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