Corruption in public procurement: entrepreneurial coalition building.
This article presents a comprehensive theoretical approach to the study of procurement corruption. It argues that corruption in public procurement can be explained by the creation and development of 'corrupt procurement coalitions' (CPCs). Functioning as a network built by corruption entrepreneurs s...
| Publicado en: | Crime, Law & Social Change Vol. 66; no. 3; pp. 291 - 312 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Oct2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=118222290&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 118222290 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09254994 CRG jtl: Crime, Law & Social Change issn: 09254994 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2016 vid: 66 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 118222290 10.1007/s10611-016-9628-4 ppf: 291 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 529KB tig: atl: Corruption in public procurement: entrepreneurial coalition building. aug: au: Hudon, Pierre-André Garzón, César affil: École nationale d'administration publique (ENAP) , 4750 Henri-Julien Avenue, Office 5094 Montreal H2T 3E5 Canada École nationale d'administration publique (ENAP) , 4750 Henri-Julien Avenue, Office 5101 Montreal H2T 3E5 Canada su: Corruption Businesspeople Government purchasing Illegality Buildings sug: subj: Corruption Businesspeople Other General Government Support Government purchasing Illegality Buildings ab: This article presents a comprehensive theoretical approach to the study of procurement corruption. It argues that corruption in public procurement can be explained by the creation and development of 'corrupt procurement coalitions' (CPCs). Functioning as a network built by corruption entrepreneurs seeking to 'milk' the procurement process, a CPC must accomplish three interrelated tasks to succeed: 1) identifying which members to include and organizing interactions of said members, 2) generating and redistributing benefits, and 3) evading internal and external control. CPCs are structured in an inner/peripheral configuration, where the inner network controls the core activities, and the peripheral networks can be activated at will when illegal tasks need to be externalized. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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