THE EMPIRICAL IDENTITY OF MORAL JUDGEMENT.
I argue that moral judgement is a natural kind on the grounds that it plays a causal/explanatory role in psychological generalizations. I then develop an empirically grounded theory of its identity as a natural kind. I argue that moral judgement is a hybrid state of moral belief and moral emotion. T...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 66; no. 265; pp. 783 - 805 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Oct2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=118369174&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 118369174 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318094 PHQ jtl: Philosophical Quarterly issn: 00318094 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2016 vid: 66 iid: 265 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 118369174 10.1093/pq/pqw019 ppf: 783 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 534KB tig: atl: THE EMPIRICAL IDENTITY OF MORAL JUDGEMENT. aug: au: KUMAR, VICTOR affil: University of Toronto, Canada su: Judgment (Psychology) Ethics Motivation (Psychology) Cognition Reasoning Philosophical research Psychology sug: subj: Judgment (Psychology) Ethics Motivation (Psychology) Cognition Reasoning Philosophical research Psychology keyword: dual process homeostasis hybrid theory internalism moral judgement natural kind ab: I argue that moral judgement is a natural kind on the grounds that it plays a causal/explanatory role in psychological generalizations. I then develop an empirically grounded theory of its identity as a natural kind. I argue that moral judgement is a hybrid state of moral belief and moral emotion. This hybrid theory supports the role of moral judgement in explanations of reasoning and action and also supports its role in a dual process model of moral cognition. Although it is composed of moral belief and moral emotion, moral judgement is unified, like other natural kinds, in virtue of underlying mechanisms that generate homeostasis among its components. Finally, this theory about the unity of moral judgement resolves a longstanding puzzle about moral motivation. The view explains how it is that moral judgements motivate all on their own but not all the time. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews. item: Philosophical Quarterly holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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