Inequality and Electoral Accountability: Class-Biased Economic Voting in Comparative Perspective.
Do electorates hold governments accountable for the distribution of economic welfare? Building on the finding of "class-biased economic voting" in the United States, we examine how electorates in advanced democracies respond to alternative distributions of income gains and losses. Drawing on individ...
| Published in: | Journal of Politics Vol. 78; no. 4; pp. 1076 - 1094 |
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| Main Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Article |
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University of Chicago Press
Oct2016
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=118438001&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 118438001 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00223816 JPO jtl: Journal of Politics issn: 00223816 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2016 vid: 78 iid: 4 pid: 415 pub: University of Chicago Press artinfo: ui: 118438001 10.1086/686157 ppf: 1076 ppct: 18 formats: tig: atl: Inequality and Electoral Accountability: Class-Biased Economic Voting in Comparative Perspective. aug: au: Hicks, Timothy Jacobs, Alan M. Matthews, J. Scott affil: University College London University of British Columbia Memorial University of Newfoundland su: United States Political accountability Income inequality Class differences Income Social classes Economics Economic voting Voters sug: subj: Political accountability Income inequality Class differences Income Social classes Economics United States Economic voting Voters ab: Do electorates hold governments accountable for the distribution of economic welfare? Building on the finding of "class-biased economic voting" in the United States, we examine how electorates in advanced democracies respond to alternative distributions of income gains and losses. Drawing on individual-level electoral data and aggregate election results across 15 countries, we examine whether lower- and middle-income voters defend their distributive interests by punishing governments for concentrating income gains among the rich. We find no indication that non-rich voters punish rising inequality and substantial evidence that electorates positively reward the concentration of aggregate income growth at the top. Our results suggest that governments commonly face political incentives systematically skewed in favor of inegalitarian economic outcomes. At the same time, we find that the electorate's tolerance of rising inequality has its limits: class biases in economic voting diminish as the income shares of the rich grow in magnitude. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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