Practical Perception and Intelligent Action.
Perceiving things to be a certain way may in some cases lead directly to action that is intelligent (e.g., skillful, wise, clever, astute). This phenomenon has not often been discussed, though it is of broad philosophical interest. It also raises a difficult question: how can perception produce inte...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Issues Vol. 26; no. 1; pp. 25 - 59 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=118989483&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 118989483 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 15336077 1731 jtl: Philosophical Issues issn: 15336077 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Oct2016 vid: 26 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 118989483 10.1111/phis.12081 ppf: 25 ppct: 34 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 199KB tig: atl: Practical Perception and Intelligent Action. aug: au: Bengson, John affil: University of Wisconsin–Madison su: Sensory perception Intellect Act (Philosophy) Psychological adaptation Phenomenological psychology Dreyfus, Hubert L., 1929-2017 Ryle, Gilbert, 1900-1976 sug: subj: Sensory perception Intellect Act (Philosophy) Psychological adaptation Phenomenological psychology Dreyfus, Hubert L., 1929-2017 Ryle, Gilbert, 1900-1976 ab: Perceiving things to be a certain way may in some cases lead directly to action that is intelligent (e.g., skillful, wise, clever, astute). This phenomenon has not often been discussed, though it is of broad philosophical interest. It also raises a difficult question: how can perception produce intelligent action? After clarifying the question-which I call the question of 'practical perception'-and explaining what is required for an adequate answer, I critically examine two candidate answers drawn from work on related topics: the first, inspired by Hubert Dreyfus's phenomenological analysis of absorbed coping (and of a piece with James Gibson's theory of affordances), focuses on awareness of situational features; the other, suggested by Gilbert Ryle's classic treatment of knowledge-how, focuses on possession of behavioral dispositions. I argue that neither approach is adequate. Subsequently, I develop and defend an alternative answer that emphasizes the agent's conceptual understanding. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophical Issues is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophical Issues holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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