Mind Misreading.

Most people think of themselves as pretty good at understanding others' beliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions. Accurate mindreading is an impressive cognitive feat, and for this reason the philosophical literature on mindreading has focused exclusively on explaining such successes. However, as...

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Published in:Philosophical Issues Vol. 26; no. 1; pp. 422 - 441
Main Author: Spaulding, Shannon
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell Oct2016
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        affil: Oklahoma State University
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        Comprehension (Theory of knowledge)
        Belief & doubt
        Philosophy of emotions
        Philosophical literature
        Social epistemology
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          Comprehension (Theory of knowledge)
          Belief & doubt
          Philosophy of emotions
          Philosophical literature
          Social epistemology
      ab: Most people think of themselves as pretty good at understanding others' beliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions. Accurate mindreading is an impressive cognitive feat, and for this reason the philosophical literature on mindreading has focused exclusively on explaining such successes. However, as it turns out, we regularly make mindreading mistakes. Understanding when and how mind misreading occurs is crucial for a complete account of mindreading. In this paper, I examine the conditions under which mind misreading occurs. I argue that these patterns of mind misreading shed light on the limits of mindreading, reveal new perspectives on how mindreading works, and have implications for social epistemology.
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