The unity of consciousness, within subjects and between subjects.
The unity of consciousness has so far been studied only as a relation holding among the many experiences of a single subject. I investigate whether this relation could hold between the experiences of distinct subjects, considering three major arguments against the possibility of such 'between-subjec...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 173; no. 12; pp. 3199 - 3222 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=119354448&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 119354448 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2016 vid: 173 iid: 12 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 119354448 10.1007/s11098-016-0658-7 ppf: 3199 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 475KB tig: atl: The unity of consciousness, within subjects and between subjects. aug: au: Roelofs, Luke affil: School of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, College of Arts and Social Sciences , The Australian National University , Canberra 0200 Australia su: Consciousness Subject (Philosophy) Philosophy of mind Phenomenology Metaphysics Experience Whole & parts (Philosophy) sug: subj: Consciousness Subject (Philosophy) Philosophy of mind Phenomenology Metaphysics Experience Whole & parts (Philosophy) keyword: Experiences Mereology Perception Unity of consciousness ab: The unity of consciousness has so far been studied only as a relation holding among the many experiences of a single subject. I investigate whether this relation could hold between the experiences of distinct subjects, considering three major arguments against the possibility of such 'between-subjects unity'. The first argument, based on the popular idea that unity implies subsumption by a composite experience, can be deflected by allowing for limited forms of 'experience-sharing', in which the same token experience belongs to more than one subject. The second argument, based on the phenomenological claim that unified experiences have interdependent phenomenal characters, I show to rest on an equivocation. Finally, the third argument accuses between-subjects unity of being unimaginable, or more broadly a formal possibility corresponding to nothing we can make sense of. I argue that the familiar experience of perceptual co-presentation gives us an adequate phenomenological grasp on what between-subjects unity might be like. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2016. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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