Understanding in-house transactions in the real estate brokerage industry.
About 20% of residential real estate transactions in North America are in-house transactions, for which buyers and sellers are represented by the same brokerage. We examine to what extent in-house transactions are explained by agents' strategic incentives as opposed to matching efficiency. Using hom...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 47; no. 4; pp. 1057 - 1087 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Winter2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=119457550&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 119457550 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Winter2016 vid: 47 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 119457550 10.1111/1756-2171.12163 ppf: 1057 ppct: 30 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 333KB tig: atl: Understanding in-house transactions in the real estate brokerage industry. aug: au: Han, Lu Hong, Seung ‐ Hyun affil: University of Toronto University of Illinois su: In-house services (Business) Real estate agents Real estate business Residential real estate Labor incentives Strategic planning sug: subj: Offices of Real Estate Agents and Brokers Offices of real estate brokers Real estate agents Other Activities Related to Real Estate Lessors of Residential Buildings and Dwellings Residential Property Managers In-house services (Business) Real estate agents Real estate business Residential real estate Labor incentives Strategic planning ab: About 20% of residential real estate transactions in North America are in-house transactions, for which buyers and sellers are represented by the same brokerage. We examine to what extent in-house transactions are explained by agents' strategic incentives as opposed to matching efficiency. Using home transaction data, we find that agents are more likely to promote internal listings when they are financially rewarded and such effect becomes weaker when consumers are more aware of agents' incentives. We further develop a structural model and find that about one third of in-house transactions are explained by agents' strategic promotion, causing significant utility loss for home buyers. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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