Passive vertical integration and strategic delegation.
With backward acquisitions in their efficient supplier, downstream firms profitably internalize the effects of their actions on their rivals' sales, while upstream competition is also relaxed. Downstream prices increase with passive, yet decrease with controlling acquisition. Passive acquisition is...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 47; no. 4; pp. 891 - 914 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Winter2016
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=119457555&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 119457555 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Winter2016 vid: 47 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 119457555 10.1111/1756-2171.12158 ppf: 891 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 280KB tig: atl: Passive vertical integration and strategic delegation. aug: au: Hunold, Matthias Stahl, Konrad affil: Heinrich Heine Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics University of Mannheim, CEPR, CESifo, and ZEW su: Economic competition Mergers & acquisitions Corporate profits Suppliers Strategic planning sug: subj: Economic competition Mergers & acquisitions Corporate profits Suppliers Strategic planning ab: With backward acquisitions in their efficient supplier, downstream firms profitably internalize the effects of their actions on their rivals' sales, while upstream competition is also relaxed. Downstream prices increase with passive, yet decrease with controlling acquisition. Passive acquisition is profitable when controlling acquisition is not. Downstream acquirers strategically abstain from vertical control, thus delegating commitment to the supplier, and with it high input prices, allowing them to charge high downstream prices. The effects of passive backward acquisition are reinforced with the acquisition by several downstream firms in the efficient supplier. The results are sustained when suppliers charge two-part tariffs. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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