On Three Measures of Explanatory Power with Axiomatic Representations.

Jonah N. Schupbach and Jan Sprenger ([2011]) and Vincenzo Crupi and Katya Tentori ([2012]) have recently proposed measures of explanatory power and have shown that they are characterized by certain arguably desirable conditions or axioms. I further examine the properties of these two measures, and a...

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Published in:British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Vol. 67; no. 4; pp. 1077 - 1090
Main Author: Cohen, Michael P.
Format: Article
Published: University of Chicago Press Dec2016
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: On Three Measures of Explanatory Power with Axiomatic Representations.
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        au: Cohen, Michael P.
        affil: American Institutes for Research, 1000 Thomas Jefferson Street NW Washington, DC 20007-3835, USA
      su:
        Axioms
        Probability density function
        Representation theory
        Mathematical notation
        Philosophy of science
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          Axioms
          Probability density function
          Representation theory
          Mathematical notation
          Philosophy of science
      ab: Jonah N. Schupbach and Jan Sprenger ([2011]) and Vincenzo Crupi and Katya Tentori ([2012]) have recently proposed measures of explanatory power and have shown that they are characterized by certain arguably desirable conditions or axioms. I further examine the properties of these two measures, and a third measure considered by I. J. Good ([1960]) and Timothy McGrew ([2003]). This third measure also has an axiomatic representation. I consider a simple coin-tossing example in which only the Crupi-Tentori measure does not perform well. The Schupbach-Sprenger and Good-McGrew measures are based on different notions of explanatory power, but both are tenable.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
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    language: English
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