Perceptual Learning Explains Two Candidates for Cognitive Penetration.
The cognitive penetrability of perceptual experiences has been a long-standing topic of disagreement among philosophers and psychologists. Although the notion of cognitive penetrability itself has also been under dispute, the debate has mainly focused on the cases in which cognitive states allegedly...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 81; no. 6; pp. 1151 - 1173 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=119538832&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 119538832 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2016 vid: 81 iid: 6 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 119538832 10.1007/s10670-015-9785-3 ppf: 1151 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 443KB tig: atl: Perceptual Learning Explains Two Candidates for Cognitive Penetration. aug: au: Arstila, Valtteri su: Perceptual learning Cognition Siegel, Susanna Macpherson, Fiona Belief & doubt Sense organs sug: subj: Perceptual learning Cognition Siegel, Susanna Macpherson, Fiona Belief & doubt Sense organs ab: The cognitive penetrability of perceptual experiences has been a long-standing topic of disagreement among philosophers and psychologists. Although the notion of cognitive penetrability itself has also been under dispute, the debate has mainly focused on the cases in which cognitive states allegedly penetrate perceptual experiences. This paper concerns the plausibility of two prominent cases. The first one originates from Susanna Siegel's claim that perceptual experiences can represent natural kind properties. If this is true, then the concepts we possess change the way things appear to us. The second candidate for cognitive penetration is Fiona Macpherson's claim that, in addition to concepts, our beliefs can penetrate perceptual experiences. It is argued that neither candidate is a case of cognitive penetration. In doing so, I provide an explanation to both that is based on perceptual learning, a non-cognitive phenomenon where relatively slow and long-lasting modifications to an organism's perceptual system bring about changes in perception. This explanation is theoretically more plausible and remains closer to the empirical data than the explanations based on cognitive penetration. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2016. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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